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Abstract
This paper provides a simple model which explains that statistical
discrimination can arise in a purely self-fulfilling manner. The story is:
(i) at the point of hiring employers cannot observe workers’ productiv-
ities but can observe only their signals, such as test score, and under
perfect competition they pay expected labor productivity conditional
on signal observation, based on their belief about return to signal ; (ii)
given the employers’ belief, workers choose effort level, which affects
joint probability distribution over pairs of productivity and signal; (iii)
in equilibrium, the employers’ belief proves to be statistically consis-
tent. We show that there may be multiple equilibria, and equilibrium
selection has nothing to do with economic fundamental.
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1 Introduction
This paper provides a simple model which explains that statistical discrimina-
tion can arise in a purely self-fulfilling manner, that is, as a multiple-equilibria
phenomenon.
The story is: (i) at the point of hiring employers cannot observe work-
ers’ productivities but can observe only their signals, such as test score, and
under perfect competition they pay expected labor productivity conditional
on signal observation, based on their belief about return to signal ; (ii) work-
ers choose effort level, which affects joint probability distribution over pairs
of productivity and signal, and such effort is high/low when the employers’
belief about return to signal is high/low; (iii) in equilibrium, the employers’
belief proves to be statistically consistent, as one can observe statistical rela-
tionship between signal and productivity ex-post. We show that there may
be multiple equilibria, and different groups of workers may fall in different
equilibria even when they have totally the same fundamental.
Statistical discrimination as a self-fulfilling prophecy phenomenon has
been widely studied. The idea of self-fulfilling prophecy in the context of
discrimination dates back to Merton [7] and Myrdal [9]. Among the works in
economic theory, the prominent ones are Arrow [2] and Coate and Loury [4].
The basic story throughout is that as employers have a belief that a given
group has high/low productivity, it encourages/discourages the workers in
that group to spend effort on skill formation in some way, and its consequence
verifies the employers’ belief in a self-fulfilling manner, while the precise
driving-force of this cycle differs across the works.
Arrow [2] considers that there are two kinds of jobs, skilled and unskilled,
and in order to be qualified for the skilled job workers need to pay some
cost, which is drawn from a distribution that is identical across groups. The
employers may have a belief that different groups have different proportions
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of being qualified, and pay different wages for the same skilled job in order
offset the cost of verifying skills. Because of the difference of wages, differ-
ent groups of workers result in generating different proportions of workers
whose cost for qualification is cheap enough, which verifies the employers’
belief in a self-fulfilling manner. Coate and Loury [4] also consider that there
are two kinds of jobs, skilled and unskilled, where the wage of each job is
exogenously given. Workers need to pay some cost to acquire the skill, which
is drawn from a distribution that is identical across groups. However, the
workers’ investments are unobservable and the employers cannot verify if a
given worker is indeed qualified at the point of hiring. Instead, the employers
assign workers to the jobs based on signals, where its distribution conditional
on being actually skilled/unskilled is common across the groups. The em-
ployers may have a belief that different groups have different proportions of
qualified workers, and set different bars on signals for the skilled job. Be-
cause of the difference in the bards workers in different groups face different
expected wages for the skilled job. Hence different groups of workers result
in different proportions of workers who in fact acquire the skill, which verifies
the employers’ belief in a self-fulfilling manner.1
Although much of the ideas are there in those studies, we would emphasize
significances of our model as follows. First, what affects workers’ effort is
employers’ belief about return to signal, that is, their belief about slope,
rather than their belief about intercept or marginal belief about regressor
(signal) or about regressand (productivity). This contrasts to Arrow [2]
and Coate and Loury [4] in which self-fulfilling belief is about proportion
of qualified workers. Note that this is not just a technical difference, since
belief about intercept alone does not affect workers’ investment, unless extra
frictions are invited and combined with it, as it determines only the constant
1For an extensive survey on statistical discrimination in general, see Fang and Moro [5]
and references therein.
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term in the formula of expected return of effort.
Second, given employers’ belief about return to signal, workers rationally
choose effort level which affects joint distribution over productivity and sig-
nal. We allow that informativeness of signal is endogenously determined, and
show that different degrees of informativeness arise across different equilib-
ria, despite that they are coming from the same underlying structure. This
contrasts to the models of regression-based statistical discrimination as pre-
sented by Phelps [10], Aigner and Cain [1], in which such effort choice is
an implicit fixed factor, and also to Lundberg and Startz [6] which assumes
exogenously different degrees of informativeness of signal across groups.
Third, the employers are “rational” and the labor market is “constrained
efficient,” in the sense that they are paying expected productivity condi-
tional on observation of signals, which is based on their conditional belief
being determined in equilibrium, and their belief is statistically verified in
equilibrium. This contrasts to Arrow [2] in which discriminatory wages have
to differ from marginal productivity of labor despite that skills are assumed
to be observable, and to Coate and Loury [4] in which wages are assumed to
be exogenous.2
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the
definition of equilibrium. In Section 3, we focus on the case of linear regres-
sion, and show that there can be multiple equilibria in which the employers’
belief about return to signal is self-fulfilling. In Section 4 we conclude by
discussing policy implications.
2Moro and Norman [8] extend the model by Coate and Loury so that wages are endoge-
nously determined, maintaining that self-fulfilling belief is about proportion of qualified
workers.
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2 The Model and Equilibrium Definition
Consider a group populated with a continuum of identical workers. Each
worker can spend effort on training or schooling, denoted by z ≥ 0. A
worker’s effort affects probability distribution over pairs of actual productiv-
ity y and signal x, where the productivity is measured in an output good.
Assume that there is no income effect on the output good, and the workers
are risk-neutral.
Let f(x, y)[z] be the density of signal/productivity pair (x, y), f(x)[z] be
the marginal density of signal x, and f(y|x)[z] be the density of productivity
y conditional on signal x, when the effort level is z.
Consider that there are identical employers. Employers’ belief is given
in the form of density φ(x, y) which is to be determined in equilibrium. Let
φ(y|x) denote the density of y conditional x, and let φ(x) denote the marginal
density of x. We consider that, ex-post, once can observe the distribution of
pairs of signal and actual productivity.
Assume that the labor market is competitive. However, note that the em-
ployers cannot observe the workers’ productivities at the point of contracting,
which can be observed only ex-post. Also, the employers cannot monitor or
verify the workers’ training efforts. Hence under perfect competition the
employers simply pay a given worker expected productivity conditional on
signal observation. Thus, a worker receives∫
yφ(y|x)dy
when she sends signal x.
Let C(z) be the cost of effort z. Then a generic worker solves
max
z
∫ ∫
yφ(y|x)dyf(x)[z]dx− C(z).
Denote the solution by z(φ), as the workers’ optimal choice depends on the
employers’ belief φ.
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In equilibrium the employers’ belief is required to be statistically consis-
tent, that is,
φ(x, y) = f(x, y)[z(φ)]
must hold. This equilibrium condition may be written in two equations,
φ(y|x) = f(y|x)[z(φ)]
φ(x) = f(x)[z(φ)],
and the first condition is what matters and the second is rather a consequence
of it.
In the next section we present a simple example of multiple equilibria and
explain the source of multiplicity. The same point can be illustrated instead
with a model in which productivity level is binary and signal level is binary,
for example. We chose the linear-normal model there in order to relate to
the linear regression practice as done in applications broadly.
3 Self-fulfilling Linear Regression
Consider that joint density of signal and productivity given effort level z
follows normal distribution,
(x, y) ∼ N
(
(µx(z), µy(z)),
(
σ2x(z) ρ(z)σx(z)σy(z)
ρ(z)σx(z)σy(z) σ
2
y(z)
))
.
It yields marginal density of signal
x ∼ N(µx(z), σ2x(z))
and conditional density
y|x ∼ N
(
µy(z)−
σy(z)
σx(z)
ρ(z)µx(z) +
σy(z)
σx(z)
ρ(z)x, (1− ρ2(z))σ2y(z)
)
.
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Then the natural candidate of equilibrium belief is also a normal distri-
bution. Let us take the regression form to describe this belief, that is,
y = α + βx+ ε, ε ∼ N(0, γ2)
and
x ∼ N(νx, γ2x).
Then, since ∫
yφ(y|x)dy = α + βx
and ∫
(α + βx)f(x)[z] = α + βµx(z),
a generic worker solves
max
z
α + βµx(z)− C(z).
Assume monotonicity and concavity condition
µ′x(z) > 0, µ
′′
x(z) ≤ 0
and
C ′(z) > 0, C ′′(z) > 0
for all z > 0, and boundary condition
lim
z→0
C ′(z) = 0, lim
z→∞
C ′(z) =∞,
or one can allow constant marginal cost by assuming the corresponding strict
concavity and boundary condition on µx.
Then the optimal choice is given by the first-order condition
βµ′x(z) = C
′(z).
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Denote its solution by z(β), as it depends only on β and not on α or γ or
else, and from the implicit function theorem it holds
z′(β) =
µ′x(z(β))
C ′′(z(β))− βµ′′x(z(β))
> 0.
Now the statistical consistency condition in equilibrium imposes
α = µy(z(β))−
σy(z(β))
σx(z(β))
ρ(z(β))µx(z(β))
β =
σy(z(β))
σx(z(β))
ρ(z(β))
γ2 = (1− ρ2(z(β)))σ2y(z(β))
νx = µx(z(β))
γ2x = σ
2
x(z(β)).
Since there is no circularity in the equations except the one for β, once β is
determined all of α, γ, νx, γx are determined uniquely.
Now let us focus on the fixed-point condition
β =
σy(z(β))
σx(z(β))
ρ(z(β)) ≡ H(β).
Notice that no restriction on σy(·), σx(·) and ρ(·) is needed to ensure the
workers’ optimal choice problem to have a smooth interior solution z(·), as it
depends only on πx(·), C(·). Moreover, no restriction on higher-order deriva-
tives of πx(·), C(·) other than on their first and second derivatives is made,
hence there is no restriction on z(·) besides it is increasing. Hence it is easy
to have H to exhibit a graph like in Figure 1. In the figure there are two equi-
libria, β and β, which are stable with respect to adaptive learning. However,
which equilibrium is selected has nothing to do with economic fundamental.
Therefore, one group of workers may fall into β and another group of worker
may fall into β, even if they have totally the same fundamental. As z(·) is
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Figure 1: Fixed-point mapping for β
increasing and πx(·) is increasing, β results in lower mean of observed signal
and β leads to higher mean of observed signal. Therefore, a group of workers
in a low equilibrium yields low return to signal and exhibits low distribution
of signal as well, and a group of workers in a high equilibrium yields high
return to signal and exhibits high distribution of signal as well.
Since the employers have zero expected profit in all equilibria, because of
perfect competition, all of expected net surplus
V (z) = µy(z)− C(z)
goes to the worker side. Hence all equilibria are Pareto-ranked. As far as
the effort levels in equilibria are below the first-best level, higher equilibrium
generates higher welfare and lower equilibrium generates lower welfare, al-
though it is possible that return to signal is too much overrated and leads to
inefficiency in the opposite side.
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4 Conclusion
Of course we do not claim that the self-fulfilling nature as demonstrated above
is the only cause of statistical discrimination or discrimination in general.
However, it gives us the following lessons.
First, if our point indeed applies to the actual discriminations, unless em-
ployers’ belief is drastically altered just promoting opportunities of training
will not help. And, even if a policy can affect employers’ belief to change,
such change may not result in a better one or the intended one. This is
consistent with the discussion by Coate and Loury [4].
Second, because the employers are in fact profit-maximizing under the
given kind of market incompleteness and informational asymmetry, they will
not be driven out by means of market force at least easily, even if they have
misperception of the underling mechanism of skill formation. In the world
written only in contractible terms, being “superficially correct” is enough for
profit maximization, and the existing employers cannot be outperformed by
potential entrants, since any contingencies about which the latter may have
better understandings than the former are not contractible.3
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